Controversial Victoria Crosses of 146th Infantry Brigade - Cpls Samuel Meekosha and George Sanders

Since its creation in 1856, in the aftermath of the Crimean War, the Victoria Cross has stood at the pinnacle of British awards given for bravery. In time, as the award was made available to soldiers and officers of the Empire and Commonwealth armed forces, it has gained the reputation of being the premier gallantry award in the world.

The Victoria Cross

The men who have received the VC have been revered as heroes, and their stories have been held up as beacons of what can be achieved by fighting forces in the most desperate of situations. Their names and deeds are remembered with pride among their regiments and services, being a source of inspiration for generations of young recruits going through their basic training at their depots.

During the Great War, four soldiers of the West Yorkshire Regiment were decorated with the VC, and two of them were Territorial Force men serving with 146^th (1^st West Riding) Infantry Brigade. One man was a war-time volunteer recruit to his battalion, the other was a pre-war Territorial. Both were corporals at the time of the actions for which they received the decoration. Both men were also promoted almost immediately afterwards, and both were later commissioned as officers. Those facts are commonly known and can be read in any published account of the VC actions, or of the men themselves. What is less well known is that both awards of the Victoria Cross were deeply unpopular within each man’s battalion at the time, and the bad feeling that was created lasted until many years later.

1147 Corporal Samuel Meekosha, B Coy, 1/6^th Battalion, received his VC for his actions on 19^th November 1915 near the Yser Canal, north of Ieper.

Sgt Samuel Meekosha wearing his VC

 3203 Corporal George Sanders, C Coy, 1/7^th (Leeds Rifles) Battalion, received his VC for his actions on 1^st July 1916 at the Schwaben Redoubt, near Thiepval, on the Somme.

Sgt George Sanders wearing his VC

Warfare on the Yser Canal in the second half of 1915, was static in terms of movement of the opposing front lines, but that is not to say that the soldiers merely held the lines and watched each other from across no man’s land. Both the German and the British armies were continually active in patrolling between the lines and mounting raids on each other’s trench networks. Because the lines were static, the artillery of each side had accurately ranged and plotted the key features of their opponents’ trench networks, and their barrages fell with devastating effects.

During this period, a study of the awards and decorations made to the officers and men of the 1^st West Riding Brigade for gallantry shows that most of them were given for feats of daring and disregarding their own safety to rescue others who had been wounded out on patrol or buried by artillery barrages in their area. The VC awarded to Corporal Meekosha was granted as a reward for leading a small group of men in digging out men who had been buried when their position was shelled.

During a period of relative inactivity, the men of B Company, 1/6^th West Yorkshire Regiment, the Bradford Territorials, were continuing with normal trench routine, posting sentries, and manning listening posts in some of the more isolated positions along the line in their area of responsibility. One such position was ‘The Pump Room. Named by the soldiers of the 1/5^th Battalion, recruited largely from Harrogate. The Pump Room in Harrogate was a product of the booming Spa Water economy in the town and was a popular venue for musical recitals at the time the Great War began. Many other of the trench names in this immediate area are named after streets and landmarks local to the men of the 49^th (West Riding) Division.

Trench Map showing The Pump Room to the left of Turco Farm

The position on the Yser front known as ‘The Pump Room’ was an isolated position near Turco Farm and it occupied a position further forward towards the German lines than almost anywhere else in this sector. As such, rotations of men every forty-eight hours, and the bringing up of rations and water, could only be accomplished under the cover of darkness. Both sides developed highly effective sniping, and the men knew that to expose themselves above the height of the parapet, even for only a couple of seconds, was virtually guaranteed to attract the attention of an enemy sniper, and such was the standard of shooting, the result was often fatal for the careless soldier that forgot himself momentarily and stood upright.

Daylight grew over a frosty expanse of the battlefield on 19^th November 1915. The sentries at the Pump Room reverted to being subterranean and making their observations through periscopes to remain hidden from view, and the remaining men would have settled to make breakfast, clean themselves and their weapons up and try to get a little sleep. Heavy shelling was reported all along the line in the Divisional area, with numerous positions reporting twenty heavy shells landing close to them before the guns probed at other positions, firing similar numbers of shells there. Messages sent back to Battalion and Brigade headquarters report numerous ‘duds’ among them, that is, shells which did not explode. The firing went on intermittently all through the day. 

Battalion messages show that the artillery began to focus on the area of the Pump Room at about 4:15pm. Except for the sentries, all the men in the position were in dug outs sleeping and generally keeping out of the way to minimise their exposure. Six men were killed when the shells hit, and seven more were reported to be suffering from shock after the bombardment. To varying degrees, all the men had been buried. Being the only uninjured non-commissioned officer, and in the absence of any officers, Corporal Meekosha took charge of the situation and with the assistance of three other men, Privates, Johnson, Sayers, and Wilkinson, they set about digging out and rescuing as many of the men as they could. It is noted that the barrage had not yet lifted from the position and heavy shelling continued while the men worked to save their comrades. The official citations for the men’s subsequent gallantry awards state that at least four lives were saved by their actions. All four of the men mentioned were recommended for the Distinguished Conduct Medal, and these were later confirmed.

From the very first of the 49^th Division’s awards and honours granted since it deployed to the Western Front, there was distrust and bad feeling among many officers and men about the allocation of awards. Some officers’ accounts appear to be more charitable than some of the soldiers in that they generally accepted that one of their brother officers had indeed earned the award with which they were decorated, even if they did have serious concerns about the circumstances quoted in official citations. Put simply, it was the right man being rewarded but for the wrong action.

The attitudes of some of the soldiers was markedly different though, and some maintained for the rest of their lives that the medals granted to some of their contemporaries were thoroughly undeserved, while others, who had performed great acts of bravery, went unrewarded. Many of the grievances the men held could be dismissed as sour grapes, especially if they had witnessed friends in a particular action not being recognised, while someone whom they considered may have had a lesser role in a battle might have received a medal, although this cannot always explain the doubts expressed.

In the case of Corporal Samuel Meekosha receiving the Victoria Cross, it must be remembered that there was no more than a platoon of men in the Pump Room position. Immediately the barrage hit it, thirteen of the men were either killed or otherwise put out of action, three men, according to official sources, joined with Meekosha to dig others out, and one man was sent back to company headquarters as a runner to report and get assistance. That leaves very few men to bear witness to what took place at the Pump Room on that afternoon. The opinions of other men must be assumed to have been formed from what they heard as the story was retold later.

Corporal Meekosha’s Victoria Cross citation states:

‘For most conspicuous bravery near the Yser on 19th November 1915. He was with a platoon of about 20 Non-Commissioned Officers and men, who were holding an isolated trench. During a very heavy bombardment by the enemy six of the platoon were killed and seven wounded, while all the remainder were more or less buried. When the senior Non-Commissioned Officers had been either killed or wounded Corporal Meekosha at once took command, sent a runner for assistance, and, in spite of no less than 10 more big shells falling within 20 yards of him, continued to dig out the wounded and buried men in full view of the enemy and at close range from the German trenches. By his promptness and magnificent courage and determination he saved at least four lives.’

The citations for the three men who received the Distinguished Conduct Medal are identical, and read as follows:

‘For conspicuous gallantry on 19th November 1915, in the isolated trench known as the 'Pump Room'. During a very heavy bombardment, when 6 men of the platoon were killed, 7 wounded and the remainder more or less buried, Corporal Meekosha took command after all his seniors were killed or wounded and commenced digging out the wounded in full view of the enemy and at short range from his trenches. By his gallant behaviour, and with the assistance of Privates Johnson, Sayers, and Wilkinson, who stuck to him and most stoutly assisted him throughout, the lives of four men were saved.’

The men who were decorated for the rescue at The Pump Room

The general feeling in the battalion was that all four men took an equal part in the rescue of the buried men, all of them exposed themselves to the same dangers and ran the same risks. It was felt that Cpl Meekosha was singled out for the Victoria Cross solely because of his rank, and not because his courage was any greater than the men he took under his charge, indeed some questioned the official version of events, providing detailed arguments against what had been written. In the first instance, men of other battalions were aghast that this event had received such recognition, when they had been involved in similar situations that had gone completely unrecognised. Sgt James Rhind, of the 1/8^th (Leeds Rifles) Battalion stated ‘Meekosha got the VC, but we didn't think he deserved it. He didn't do anything that anybody else wouldn't have done in the same circumstances. It caused a lot of ill-feeling because incidents like that were happening all the time and not getting any official recognition.’ It is easy to have sympathy with Sgt Rhind’s opinion, three men of his own battalion had received Distinguished Conduct Medals for their part in an almost identical rescue at the Pump Room some time earlier, and it is supported by many men who were witnesses to feats of bravery which, for one reason or another, went entirely unrewarded. The fact that Cpl Meekosha had initially been recommended for the Distinguished Conduct Medal, and intimation had been received that this would be the award he would get before it was substituted by the VC particularly rankled across the brigade. This does not mean that Cpl Meekosha was not deserving of a VC on 19^th November 1915. It simply means that other men, who perhaps were also deserving of a VC went unrecognised, or received a lesser award, and doubt should not be cast upon the veracity of the VC award to Meekosha because of this. Other eyewitnesses attested to the fact that Meekosha himself had been partially buried and need to be dug out before he was able to take charge and coordinate the rescue effort. If that assertion is true, it raises two points. The first is that Meekosha may have been in shock or injured himself (though this is not mentioned anywhere in any reports, official or otherwise) and needed to muster all his self-control and courage to turn his attention to the task at hand, foregoing any understandable desire he might have felt to look after himself first. The second point is that he was dug out of his sudden burial by the Wilkinson brothers. One was decorated, the other was not. Was one of them the runner that was sent back to HQ to raise the alarm, thereby taking no further part in the rescue and, therefore, not recognised as playing a crucial part in it?
Getting from The Pump Room back to Battalion Headquarters in daylight, under shell and rifle fire was no easy task, and had that feat occurred only months later, it is reasonable to suggest that it might have been recognised by the award of the newly created Military Medal.

Many men of the 1^st West Riding Brigade had experienced rescues of men buried by shell fire in this sector of the line, north of Ypres. They knew how difficult it was to dig men out before they suffocated and died. Two men working together had manged to dig out three buried men, but not before all three had lost consciousness. The facts, as stated in the citation for Cpl Meekosha’s VC, were unbelievable to many. Meekosha and his party were credited with digging out thirteen men, four of whom survived. Statements from men close by stated that Meekosha had been assisted by six men, not three, and none reported the use of artificial resuscitation actions on any of the men who had been dug out. Men across the brigade, drawing on their own experiences, simply did not believe the story as it was announced in the London Gazette. They questioned why three men had disappeared from the account, and the opinion took root that they had been pressured to stand aside to make the story more exceptional, and thus more likely to attract the ultimate honour. Of course, none of this can be proved beyond doubt more than a century later, but assertions of manipulation of the story came from so many at the time, that it is likely that the truth of the matter is somewhat different to that which was officially accepted as the basis on which to award a VC.

Following the announcement of his VC, Cpl Meekosha was promoted. He remained a Sergeant in the battalion until he was discharged to take up a commission on 15^th August 1917. He served as a 2^nd Lt with 1/5^th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment until December 1917 when he was sent home sick (although he had also been wounded). Following a partial recovery, he was posted to the Infantry Records Office at York, before transferring to the Corps of Military Accountants in 1919 in which corps he served until retirement in 1926.

The second VC to be awarded to a West Yorkshire Regiment Territorial soldier came in the summer of 1916 when Cpl George Sanders of 1/7^th (Leeds Rifles) Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment was awarded his VC for the action in the Schwaben Redoubt near Thiepval over thirty-six hours from 1^st to 3^rd July 1916 at the very beginning of the Battle of the Somme. Like the VC awarded to Cpl Samuel Meekosha, the VC to Cpl George Sanders was hugely controversial, although while that to Cpl Meekosha provoked disquiet within the brigade, the notoriety of Cpl Sanders’ VC spread across the whole of 49^th (West Riding) Division.

The plan for the opening of the Battle of the Somme was for 49^th (West Riding) Division to be positioned in Aveluy Wood acting as the Reserve Division for X Corps, with 36^th (Ulster) Division, and 32^nd Division attacking roughly north-easterly and eastward respectively, with the Ulstermen attacking the formidable German defences on the slope of the valley side as it rises from the River Ancre, while 32^nd Division attacked Thiepval village itself to the south of the Ulstermen.

The attack by the Ulster Division had been very successful, except for in the valley bottom by the river, but that success had cost the division many casualties, making the deployment of the Corps Reserve, the 49^th Division, necessary to support the Ulstermen to ensure their gains were held.

A party of thirty men from C Company, 1/7^th Battalion, under the command of the senior surviving NCO, Cpl George Sanders found themselves cut off in the German ‘B’ Line, just north west of the Schwaben Redoubt, and here, these men would stay and fight until they were relieved, a day and a half later. The Germans made repeated attacks in strength on the position held by the Leeds men, but each time they were beaten back, often in confusion and disarray. On one occasion the Germans were thrown back with such ferocity that they abandoned some prisoners taken from the Ulster Division, who made their way back to their own lines.

The Leeds men fought well, and with such professionalism that they were able to make their ammunition, including that taken from casualties, last until their own relief. Contemporary accounts tell how every man took the time to aim carefully before firing, making sure every shot counted and took a German out of the fight. When relief came, after thirty-six hours marooned in the Schwaben Redoubt, in the form of a party of Ulstermen, twenty-two of the thirty men filed out of the position and made their way back into Thiepval Wood. The official citation for Sanders’ VC states that only nineteen men made it out alive, but research carried out by Dr Pat Morris for her PhD Thesis confirmed the extra three men.

The citation for George Sanders’ VC reads:

‘For most conspicuous bravery. After an advance into the enemy's trenches, he found himself isolated with a party of thirty men. He organised his defences, detailed a bombing party, and impressed on his men that his and their duty was to hold the position at all costs. Next morning, he drove off an attack by the enemy and rescued some prisoners who had fallen into their hands. Later two strong bombing attacks were beaten off. On the following day he was relieved after showing the greatest courage, determination, and good leadership during 36 hours under very trying conditions. All this time his party was without food and water, having given all their water to the wounded during the first night. After the relieving force was firmly established, he brought his party, nineteen strong, back to our trenches.’

The recommendation for the award was made by officers of the Ulster Division, and not by any of the Leeds Rifles officers, and it has been suggested that this indicates two potential problems with the recommendation.

Trench map showing the area of the Schwaben Redoubt (behind point 91)

The first is that the evidence gathered by the officers from the Ulster Division was hurriedly collated and relied heavily on the account given by Sanders himself in the process of handing over the position to his relief. No other survivor of the party said he was asked about the actions of the previous thirty-six hours, and that as Sanders was the senior rank present, his was the only account the Ulster officers were interested in hearing.

The second aspect of it is that no recommendation for any kind of award was made for Sanders by his own officers, yet they were happy to make recommendations for men of the party who went on to receive Military Medals and Gallantry Cards because of those recommendations. One reason for this was put forward by some of the men who survived their time in the Schwaben Redoubt, and that is that Sanders, as the senior man in the position had received an order, via a runner, to withdraw from the position at 10:00 pm on the first night the men were out. Each man stated that the runner had delivered the message to Sanders, that Sanders understood what was expected of him, and that the runner also told the men that they would be withdrawing soon as he left to return to Thiepval Wood. They further assert that Sanders deliberately ignored the order to withdraw, some suggesting that he wanted to make a name for himself. Lastly, the men were certain that although there were wounded men in the party at the time, none had yet died, the inference being that had Sanders complied with the order and taken his men back to the wood, those eight men who lost their lives would probably have been saved. Some of the men who survived the action said that rather than getting the VC, Sanders should have been court martialled and reduced in rank to Rifleman, especially as every other commander of isolated parties had complied with the order to withdraw, delivered by the same runner, despite the weight of the shelling on the Schwaben Redoubt at the time.

Battle of the Somme. British Artillery bombarding the German trenches (Schwaben Redoubt), 1st July 1916 IWM Q 7

It should be made clear that, even before the action at the Schwaben Redoubt, Cpl Sanders was not a very well-liked man among his peers. A church chorister before the war, he was often called upon to entertain the officers mess with his singing, and his boastful manner about his closeness with the officers in the battalion did not impress the soldiers in C Company. Many of them attested to his aloofness, his arrogance, and his unwillingness to mix or associate with other men in his company. Of course, this attitude towards George Sanders could be dismissed as sour grapes or jealousy of the young Corporal who was awarded the highest decoration for bravery, was then commissioned, and later received a Military Cross for his personal bravery in April 1918. During the Second World War, however, he was appointed to the command of the Leeds Corporation Gas Workers Home Guard unit, which was unique in that there were three holders of the VC in its ranks. As well as Sanders, now a Home Guard major, there was also Major Wilfred Edwards, who served in the Home Guard as a Captain, subordinate to Sanders, and William Boynton Butler, who served as a Sergeant. Many of the men interviewed by Dr Morris who had served with him in the Home Guard reported that he was a bad tempered, argumentative man who did all he could to undermine Wilf Edwards and bully Bill Butler. The opinions of men unconnected with the Leeds Rifles in the Great War, and not involved in the Thiepval action seem to support the earlier opinions expressed by the men who were involved, and this, it seems, negates the sour grapes and jealousy somewhat. It also needs to be said that being unpopular with your peers is no disqualification to being awarded the Victoria Cross. You do not have to be well liked to be a brave fighting soldier.

Of the men who survived the Schwaben Redoubt action, many said that another man, a Lance Corporal, had taken a leading role in organising and positioning the men, had ensured that ammunition was equally distributed and kept the men’s vigilance and spirits high. They asserted that his contribution was every bit as important as that of George Sanders, and when it came to it, he fought with equal if not greater valour. The Lance Corporal was not counted among the survivors of the action, because he and another man had carried a man who had had a foot blown off and the other leg broken by a German grenade from the redoubt back into Thiepval Wood. They were prevented from returning to the redoubt by the orders of their officers. Despite having left the redoubt only a couple of hours earlier than the remaining men, the Lance Corporal and his Rifleman helper did not receive any immediate reward for their own bravery and selflessness in getting the wounded man to relative safety. More than a year later, the Lance Corporal received a French Croix de Guerre in respect of his conduct from 1^st to 3^rd July 1916.

When George Sanders’ VC was gazetted, it was met with anger in the battalion, which soon spread to the rest of the Brigade. To the men who had been involved in the Schwaben Redoubt action, this Victoria Cross did not compare with that to Samuel Meekosha. In that case, the opinion was that his award was over-inflated because of his rank, but that no one who had deserved the VC had been denied it. In the case of George Sanders’ VC, the consensus was that while a VC was deserved for what had happened at Schwaben Redoubt, someone other than Sanders was deserving of it. They were adamant that the right man had been ignored by virtue of him having been retained in the wood unable to return to the action, and because they were sure that George Sanders had over reported his own actions in the fighting to the Ulster Division officers to satisfy his own need to make a name for himself, and more likely, to deflect any potential disciplinary proceedings that may be brought against him for disobeying an order, which if he had been found guilty at court martial could have led to him being executed by firing squad. There was a suspicion in the battalion that Lt Col Kirk, the battalion’s Commanding Officer, had supported the award of the VC for no better reason than that it would put his Leeds battalion back on a level with their arch-rivals from Bradford.

Such was the strength of feeling among the other ranks of the battalion, that when Cpl Sanders was promoted to Lance Sergeant immediately after his award was published, the men were sure that it had been done to give Sanders the protection of being a Sergeants Mess member, with a degree of separation from the men when out of the line. When, like Samuel Meekosha, Sanders was posted away from the battalion to train for a commission, no one in the battalion was sorry to see him go. One of the men of the Schwaben Redoubt wrote: ‘I hope he doesn't come back to us, as he got 'swelled head' before he left.’

George Sanders did not come back to the battalion. Instead, he was posted to 1/6^th Battalion, the Bradford Territorials who Lt Col Kirk was so keen to get even with, and which Samuel Meekosha had originally belonged to.

Whatever the opinions of his former colleagues in the 1/7^th Leeds Rifles, George Sanders VC, by April 1918 was serving as a captain, and at Wytschaete proved his own personal bravery beyond any doubt. He received a Military Cross for the desperate action fought on 24^th April. The citation for this award is as follows:

‘For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. After the enemy had penetrated the front line, he promptly organised his men in support and effectually held up the enemy for some time, inflicting heavy casualties. He stood on top of a 'pill-box' firing his revolver into the enemy at 20 yards. His splendid example of courage did much to inspire his men at a critical time.’

What the citation fails to mention is that by the time Captain Sanders climbed on top of the ‘pill-box’ he had already been wounded in his right arm and was firing his revolver with his left hand. He continued firing until he had fired his last round of ammunition and was seen to fall when surrounded by German soldiers. It was assumed at the time that he had been killed, but without confirmation of that, he was reported to be wounded and missing. Nothing was heard about him until his father received a postcard from his son via the Red Cross, telling him that he was alive and recovered from his wounds, and was now being held as a prisoner at Karlsruhe in Germany.

The Leeds Mercury announces George Sanders' Military Cross. 10 July 1918

Unfortunately for George Sanders VC the award of a Military Cross for exceptional bravery did nothing to soften the opinion of him in his former battalion. Like many battalions in the years after the Great War ended, the Leeds Rifles held many reunions and social events for the men who had served in their ranks. Despite living in the city, George Sanders rarely attended Leeds Rifles Comrades functions, unless he had been invited as a guest of honour, such as being invited to unveil the Leeds Rifles War Memorial at Leeds Parish Church. He also attended the dedication service for the 49^th (West Riding) Division Memorial at Essex Farm Cemetery, near Ypres in 1924.

In the absence of George Sanders, at Leeds Rifles Comrades functions, the former Lance Corporal who had done much to organise the defence of the Schwaben Redoubt, taken the fight to the Germans, and carried a seriously wounded man from the redoubt to Thiepval Wood, was hailed by many of those attending, officers included, as 'The man who should have got the VC'.

George Sanders died in Leeds in 1950. His death attracted no coverage in the local newspapers at the time, and when it was finally mentioned that he had died, some weeks later, it was as a small part of a retrospective article about Victoria Cross holders from the whole of Yorkshire. Despite there being no negative press about George Sanders during his lifetime, it seems that the local newspapers may have been aware of his reputation and avoided printing anything about him, except for when he was the special guest at a military function. Despite Sanders’ death in 1950, the former members of the battalion continued to introduce the other man as ‘The man who should have got the VC’ until his death in 1971. For that animosity to persist over so many years, the grievance surrounding the VC to George Sanders must have been deep rooted.

The VC to Samuel Meekosha provoked consternation in the Brigade, mainly due to the level of the award his actions prompted. It was an exceptional award for doing something that many of the infantrymen considered to be almost part of current trench routine and had been participants in themselves. There was a feeling that this VC was awarded as much as a morale boosting statement after the Division had spent months in the same sector, during which time, their existence in the front line had been miserable, trying, and which the men in the trenches felt was exposing them to disproportionate dangers for no measurable benefit to the cause of fighting the war, as it was to actually recognise an heroic episode where a man went far beyond what could reasonably be expected of him in an effort to rescue his friends. The men of the battalion appear to have responded to the Victoria Cross award to Cpl Meekosha with pragmatism. Undoubtedly, there will have been men who felt they had been overlooked, while someone else had been over-rewarded, but in the main, the men in the battalion simply accepted it as something they had no influence over and were not going to allow it to distract them from their task. They understood that if it had not been Samuel Meekosha on 19^th November 1915, it could just as easily have been someone else a day, a week, or a month later, and they got on with their day-to-day soldiering.

Samuel Meekosha VC

In the case of the Sanders VC, there were more witnesses and participants in the action that brought it than there were in the Meekosha action. The men who were in the Schwaben Redoubt during the time Cpl Sanders was in command of the party fully believed that they had witnessed a more junior Non-Commissioned Officer play a more important role in the defence of their position, but because the officers in the relief from the Ulster Division had only recognised the senior corporal and took the handover from him, their own opinions and experiences were never properly examined. They could not tell their stories. This, in their view, ensured that Cpl Sanders was free to embellish his own part in the actions of the previous thirty-six hours, and possibly because of how Sanders behaved and was perceived as an officers’ favourite throughout his time in the battalion, they may have been angered that someone they simply did not like was rewarded, while someone whom they did like, and believed should have been recognised instead, was ignored for over a year. As well as the suspicion that the Commanding Officer of the battalion supported the award to Cpl Sanders to get even with the Bradford Battalion, there was also a suggestion that the VC for Sanders was supported because he had been employed at the Kitson Engineering works in Leeds before the war, a director of which was Lt Col Edwin Kitson-Clark, the Commanding Officer of the 8^th and 1/8^th Leeds Rifles at the beginning of the war who was replaced a week before the battalion went overseas in April 1915. The unsubstantiated suggestion was that a VC to an employee would reflect well on the Kitson Company.

Captain George Sanders VC MC after his repatriation from Germany

On balance, it seems that the VC awarded to Cpl George Sanders was deserved, and that opposition to it stems entirely from the fact that he was not a likeable man. The facts of the action portray an organised and coordinated defence of a position over many hours in the face of repeated attempts by the enemy to throw the men out of it. The officers of the Ulster Division which led the relief of the Leeds Riflemen would have had neither time nor inclination to write down a detailed account of the previous thirty-six hours beyond a few names and a general description of what had happened. There simply would not have been the time to interview every man present. Nor would they have been able to trace, find and interview the men who had recently left the Schwaben Redoubt position. That the contribution of those men initially went unrecorded and unrewarded is regrettable, and some responsibility for this may lie with Cpl Sanders if he neglected to report the actions of those men to the officers who relieved him. Knowing the character of the man, this could be a reasonable conclusion to draw, however, it must also be remembered that he had been in command of a party of thirty men who had been fighting almost continually for thirty-six hours, and for most of that time he had not had anything to eat or drink. Extreme fatigue must have had some bearing on the accuracy of any statement he gave to the Ulster Division officers, and perhaps if he did make any omission from his statement, that might be forgivable under the circumstances.

The medals of Samuel Meekosha VC

It seems to me that the anger the VC to George Sanders provoked, and the lingering animosity that lasted for 60 years was more to do with the fact that George Sanders was not a particularly nice man and was already deeply unpopular among his peers, than it did with what he, or others, had done in the Schwaben Redoubt. His own attitude after the award was made did nothing to help him overcome that at the time or in later years. Similarly, the assertion of some of the men in the Schwaben Redoubt that the matter of the VC should have been settled by means of a ballot, as allowed for in Clause 13 of the Victoria Cross Warrant, but not appropriate for this action, due to there being fewer than fifty men involved, seems to have been given such backing because the men knew that it would come down to a straight vote on the popularity of the men in question. That the man who was favoured for the VC by most of those present in the Schwaben Redoubt went unrecognised for a year before he received the French Croix de Guerre is regrettable for two reasons; firstly, the man had obviously performed in a manner far beyond that which could be expected of a Lance Corporal, and was undoubtedly deserving of an immediate award and secondly, when the Croix de Guerre was finally awarded, it came too late to have any tempering effect on the anger felt within the battalion.

The medals of George Sanders VC MC